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This paper provides a conceptual framework on fair collective choice rules that
synthesizes the studies of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) on
the one hand and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) on the other. We show that both frameworks
have the following binary relation as a common origin: an allocation x is at least as good
as an allocation z if (i) x Pareto dominates z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. Its transitive-
closure and the strict relation derive diﬀerent ranking criteria, but remarkably, with
respect to the maximal elements, they have a set-inclusive relationship.
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1 Introduction
There has been a large literature which pointed out a fundamental conﬂict between eq-
uity and eﬃciency. In the context of equity as no-envy, the conﬂict was ﬁrst shown by
Kolm (1972), Feldman and Kirman (1974) and Pazner and Schmeidler (1974). On the other
hand, it has been a vital problem in welfare economics and social choice theory to construct
ranking and choice criteria based on Pareto eﬃciency accompanied with a suitable notion
of equity. The New Welfare Economics bases its analysis on ordinally non-comparable
utilities, and attempts have been made in constructing choice rules that extend the Pareto
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1criterion. In re-examining the Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky Hypothetical Compensation Tests
and their drawback of cyclicity, Little (1957) emphasized the need of incorporating distri-
butional value judgment.1 The concept of no-envy satisﬁes the classic framework of ordinal
non-comparability, and the social choice literature formalized several collective choice rules
that rationalize certain binary relations based on Pareto eﬃciency and no-envy.2
Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) found that the set of Pareto eﬃcient and envy-free
allocations are rationalized by the transitive closure of the following binary relation: an
allocation x is at least as good as an allocation z (hereafter referred to as xR∗y) if (i) x
Pareto dominates z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. As such, R∗ is a weak form of the ranking
based on equity-as-no-envy and Pareto eﬃciency. Suzumura (1981) formalized in a general
social-choice framework, and showed that the choice rule by Goldman and Sussangkarn
(1978) (hereafter ‘GS rule’) satisﬁes important equity and eﬃciency properties. Tadenuma
(1998), on the other hand, introduced two contrasting principles to socially rank allocations:
the eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle ranks an allocation x higher than z if (i) x Pareto dominates
z or (ii) x and z are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equitable whereas z is not; the equity-
ﬁrst principle reverses the order of application of the two criteria. Tadenuma (2002, 2005)
extended the analysis on equity-as-no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence respectively, and
Nishimura (2000) characterized these two rules from the following general rule for weighing
equity and eﬃciency (hereafter ‘a weighing rule’): x is socially better than z if x is more
eﬃcient or more equitable than z, and the other criterion does not make the opposite
suggestion. The weighing rule accommodates standpoints in classic welfare economics in
that Pareto Principle is not suﬃcient for decision-making without taking an equity criterion
into account (e.g., Little (1957)).
Tadenuma (1998) correctly noted that Tadenuma’s (1998, 2002, 2005) framework is
1A number of works followed his provocative argument, focusing on the logical consistency of the ranking
rule. Especially, Sen (1963) pointed out that a key for consistent value judgment is transitivity of the
criterion. See Suzumura (1980) for an excellent review of a large literature and a formal analysis that
investigated the consistency of all proposed criteria.
2In an early work, Varian (1974) provided insightful discussions on this issue.
2independent of Suzumura (1981) in terms of the domain of social-choice problems and
the logical relationships between axioms under consideration. Having acknowledged this
fact, we show that both frameworks have R∗ as a common origin (Theorems 1 and 2).
Its transitive-closure and the strict relation derive diﬀerent ranking criteria (Examples 1
and 2), but remarkably, with respect to the maximal elements, they have a set-inclusive
relationship, so that one can be regarded as a reﬁnement of the other (Theorem 3).
2 The Model
In an economy there are n agents. Each agent i ∈ N ≡ {1,...,n} has a preference relation
represented by a utility function ui : X → I R deﬁned over a set X. Each allocation
determines each agent’s consumption bundle. Let S∗ ⊂ Xn be the set of feasible allocations
in an economy: any x ∈ S∗ is a list of (x1,...,xn), where xi is a consumption bundle of
agent i (i = 1,...,n).
We examine the problem of ranking allocations among a set of allocations, S ⊂ S∗,
based on Pareto eﬃciency and equity as no-envy. For allocations x,z ∈ Xn, x P z if
and only if ui(xi) ≥ ui(zi) for all i = 1,...,n with strict inequality for at least one i: we
call these situations that x Pareto dominates z. An allocation x ∈ S is Pareto eﬃcient
in S if and only if there is no z ∈ S such that z P x. Let P(S) be the set of Pareto
eﬃcient allocations in S. An allocation x ∈ Xn is envy-free (or no-envy) if and only if
ui(xi) ≥ ui(xj) for all i ∈ N and j ∈ N. Let F(S) be the set of envy-free allocations in S.
For all x,z ∈ S, x FE z if and only if x ∈ F(S) and z 6∈ F(S).3
For a binary relation R, let P(R) be a strict ordering of R: xP(R)z iﬀ xRz and not
zRx. The set of maximal elements can be deﬁned as MR(S) ≡ {x ∈ S| 6∃z ∈ S, zRx}. For
binary relations R1 and R2, R1 includes R2 iﬀ xR2z implies xR1z for all x and z.
3Tadenuma (2002) considered the reﬁned ordering based on Feldman-Kirman’s (1974) cardinal measure,
whereas Tadenuma (1998, 2007) considered the choice problem that corresponds to FE.
33 Ranking Allocations Based on Equity and Eciency
3.1 R∗ and GS rule
Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) explored the construction of social orderings based on
the following binary-relation R∗:
xR∗z ⇐⇒ x P z or x FE z. (1)
Namely, an allocation x is at least as good as an allocation z if (i) x Pareto dominates
z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. In constructing social orderings based on equity-as-no-envy
and Pareto eﬃciency, this is a natural starting point.
Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) considered the transitive clo-
sure of R∗, T(R∗).
xT(R∗)z ⇐⇒ ∃z1,z2,...,zt ∈ S s.t. xR∗z1,z1R∗z2, ..., ztR∗z.
Let GS(S) ≡ {x ∈ S|∀z ∈ S, xT(R∗)z or ¬zT(R∗)x} (hereafter referred to as the GS
rule). It is easy to see the following:
GS(S) = MP(T(R∗))(S). (2)
Namely, the GS rule is the maximal elements of the strict ordering of the transitive closure
of R∗. Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978, Theorem 4) showed that, if P(S) ∩ F(S) 6= ∅,
then GS(S) = P(S) ∩ F(S). Suzumura (1981) called this property as Fairness Extension:
if there are Pareto eﬃcient and equitable allocations, then they should be all selected.
Suzumura (1981, Theorems 1 and 3) also introduced a complementary condition of Fairness
Inclusion4, and proved that the GS rule is the smallest choice rule that satisﬁes the Fairness
Inclusion.
4If a choice function selects z ∈ S, then any allocation x ∈ S such xR
∗z should also be selected.
43.2 Nishimura (2000) and Tadenuma (2002, 2005)
Nishimura (2000) examined a class of the social choice orderings called the general rule for
weighing equity and eﬃciency (hereafter ‘a weighing rule’), based on equity and eﬃciency
relation. Deﬁne a relation w such that:
x w z ⇐⇒ (a) x P z and ¬(z FE x) or (b) x FE z and ¬(z P x). (3)
It basically suggests that x is socially better than z if x is more eﬃcient or more equitable
than z, and the other criterion does not make the opposite suggestion. The conditions sub-
sume widely-acceptable standpoints in classic welfare economics, in that Pareto Principle
is not suﬃcient for decision-making without taking an equity criterion into account (e.g.,
Little (1957)).5 It is immediate to see that R∗ includes w, but the converse may not
necessarily hold: in the conﬂicting situations where x P z and z FE x, xR∗z and zR∗x
(R∗ recommends indiﬀerence), but w reserves the judgment.
Other than R∗, two representative social choice rules that include w are Tadenuma’s
(2002, 2005) Eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle (PFE) and Equity-ﬁrst principle (FEP). The
eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle ranks an allocation x higher than z (x PFE z) if and only if
(a) x P z or (b) x 6P z, z 6P x and x FE z. As to the equity-ﬁrst principle, x FEP z
if and only if (a) x FE z or (b) x 6FE z, z 6FE x and x P z.6 Both of them include a
relation w in common, and give additional judgments in the conﬂicting situations where
x P z and z FE x. Namely, each principle gives a priority to one criterion over the other
lexicographically, as a natural resolution to the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.7
5Condition (a) is motivated from a standpoint that the Paretian relationship is not suﬃcient for allocation
x to be better than z. Condition (b) is an extension of the classical relation in welfare economics to make
an equity-comparison among Pareto noncomparable states.
6Condition (b) of PFE is called P-conditional no-envy by Tadenuma (1998, 2005, 2007). Condition (b)
of FEP is a complementary condition of F-conditional Pareto. Tadenuma (1998, 2007) uses the relation
FE as an equity relationship, whereas Tadenuma (2002) used the fairness ordering based on Feldman and
Kirman (1974), and Tadenuma (2005) used the egalitarian-equivalence. The analysis of the present paper
remains valid for any of these fairness orderings.
7As another example in an economic environment where X = I R
|M|
+ , M = {1,...,m}, one can consider
54 Main Theorems
For binary relations R1 and R2, R1 = R2 iﬀ xR1z ⇐⇒ xR2z for all x,z ∈ Xn. The
following theorems clarify a connection between R∗ in Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978)
and Nishimura (2000) and Tadenuma’s (2002, 2005):
Theorem 1 P(R∗) = w.
Proof: Suppose that xP(R∗)z. This implies [x P z or x FE z] and not [z P
x or z FE x]. Consider ﬁrst the case that x P z. By the nature of the Pareto ranking,
z P x would not happen. To prevent zR∗x to happen, z FE x should not happen.
Consider next the case that x FE z. By the same logic, z P x should not happen.
Taking these two consequences together, we conclude that x w z. Examination of (3)
immediately leads to conclude that x w z implies xP(R∗)z. Q.E.D.
For binary relations R1 and R2, let R1 ∪ R2 be a binary relation that indicates xR1 ∪
R2z ⇐⇒ xR1z or xR2z for all x,z ∈ Xn.
Theorem 2 (i) P ∪P(R∗) = PFE. (ii) FE ∪P(R∗) = FEP. (iii) PFE ∪ FEP =
R∗.
Theorem 2.(i) and 2.(ii) show a dual property: PFE (resp. FEP) is characterized as
an eﬃcient (resp. equitable) part of the weighing rule. Theorem 2.(iii) means the union
composes R∗.
Proof: From Theorem 1, we refer to (3) in examining P(R∗). Suppose that x P
∪P(R∗)z. Then, condition (a) of PFE is automatically satisﬁed by P. To see that
condition (b) of PFE is satisﬁed, suppose that x 6P z and z 6P x. Then only condition (b)
of (3) can be used for ranking x and z. It implies that x FE z has to hold. Therefore, we
conclude that x P ∪P(R∗)z implies x PFE z. Suppose next x PFE z. Then condition




i} < ¯ x
l for
some l ∈ M and i ∈ N, then x  z (eﬃciency is given priority when some person’s consumption bundle is
below some poverty line). Otherwise, z  x (equity is given priority otherwise).
6(a) of PFE implies x P z and condition (a) of (3). Suppose that x FE z and ¬(z P x).
There are two possibilities: x P z or ¬(x P z). Applying conditions (a) and (b) of PFE
respectively, we conclude that x is ranked higher than z, which is condition (b) of (3). This
completes part (i) of the theorem. Part (ii) of the theorem is shown exactly the same way.
To show (iii), PFE ∪ FEP = P ∪ FE ∪P(R∗) = R∗ ∪ P(R∗) = R∗. Q.E.D.
If we deﬁne a common relationship by an operator ∩, then, as a dual version of Theorem
2.(iii), PFE ∩ FEP = P(R∗).
These two theorems and the previous results on GS rule clarify the common origin as
well as the diﬀerence of the GS rule and the weighing rule. Both have R∗ ranking as a basic
relationship. The GS rule extends the transitive-closure of R∗, whereas the weighing rule
and Tadenuma’s (2002, 2005) two rules are derived from the strict relationship, P(R∗).
Our discussion so far is summarized as follows:
Corollary 1
P(T(R∗)) ⇒ T(R∗) ⇐ R∗ ⇐⇒ PFE ∪ FEP ⇐ PFE ∩ FEP ⇐⇒ P(R∗) ⇐⇒ w,
where, for example, P(T(R∗)) ⇒ T(R∗) indicates a fact that T(R∗) includes P(T(R∗)).
Notice that P(T(R∗)) is the base binary relation of GS(S) according to (2), so that Corol-
lary 1 clariﬁes the relationship between GS rule and Tadenuma’s (2002, 2005) rules.
The following examples show that P(T(R∗)) and P(R∗) do not have logical relation-
ships:
Example 1 Suppose that S = {x,x0,z}, F(S) = {x,z}, x ∈ P(S), x0 P z and ¬(x P
z). x FE x0 and x0 P z, so xT(R∗)z. On the other hand, neither zR∗x nor x0R∗x, so
that ¬(zT(R∗)x), i.e., xP(T(R∗))z. However, by (3), xP(R∗)z does not hold.
Example 2 Suppose that S = {x,x0,z}, F(S) = {z} and x P x0, x0 P z. By (3),
xP(R∗)x0. But x0 P z and z FE x imply x0T(R∗)x, so xP(T(R∗))x0 does not hold.
7However, with respect to the maximal elements, there are the following notable relation-
ships.
Theorem 3 (i) When P(S) ∩ F(S) 6= ∅, GS(S) ⊂ MP(R∗)(S) and GS(S) ⊂ MPFE(S) ∪
MFEP(S). (ii) When P(S)∩F(S) = ∅, MP(R∗)(S) ⊂ GS(S) and MPFE(S)∪MFEP(S) ⊂
GS(S).
Proof: In the Appendix we show that MP(R∗)(S) = MPFE(S) ∪ MFEP(S). For (i),
GS(S) = P(S) ∩ F(S) as introduced above, and MPFE(S) = P(S) ∩ F(S) by Tadenuma
(Proposition 3.(i)). For (ii), it can be shown that, if P(S) ∩ F(S) = ∅, GS(S) = F(S) ∪
{x|∃z ∈ F(S), x P z}. Also, MFEP(S) = P(F(S)) and MPFE(S) = {x ∈ S|x ∈
P(S) and x P z ∀z ∈ F(S)} (Tadenuma (2002, Propositions 3.(ii)8 and 5)). Clearly,
both are subsets of GS(S). Q.E.D.
The following examples show that the converse set inclusions in (ii) and (iii) do not
hold:
[P(S) ∩ F(S) 6= ∅ and GS(S) 6⊃ MP(R∗)(S)]: In Example 1, GS(S) = {x}. On the
other hand, MPFE(S) = {x} and MFEP(S) = {x,z}, so MP(R∗) = {x,z}.
The fact that there is no envy-free allocation that Pareto dominates z will make it
survive in the weighing rule (in other words, MP(R∗)(S) does not satisfy the Fairness
Extension), whereas the GS rule satisﬁes the Fairness Extension.
[P(S) ∩ F(S) = ∅ and MP(R∗)(S) 6⊃ GS(S)]: In Example 2, GS(S) = {x,x0,z}. On
the other hand, MPFE(S) = {x} and MFEP(S) = {z}, so MP(R∗) = {x,z}.
The x0 belongs to GS(S) from the fact that x0 Pareto dominates an equitable state z.
On the other hand, the standpoint of Nishimura (2000) and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) is that,
as long as that x0 is Pareto dominated by another feasible allocation x, there is no reason
for x0 to belong to the choice set. A property of GS(S) in Example 2 — no ﬁner selection
8As noted in Tadenuma (2002, footnote 8), his Proposition 3.(ii) is originally shown in Nishimura (2000).
8from S — is reﬂected in its violation of the Chernoﬀ’s Axiom, as shown in Suzumura
(1981); similarly, from Example 1 one can see the violation of the complementary axiom
of the Superset Axiom.9 On the other hand, one can show that MFEP(S) satisﬁes the
Chernoﬀ’s Axiom and the Superset Axiom, and MPFE(S) satisﬁes the Chernoﬀ’s Axiom
(Nishimura (2000, Lemma 2)). See also Nishimura (2007) and Tadenuma (2002, 2007) for
other results for MFEP(S) and MPFE(S).10
Studies including Kolm (1972), Feldman and Kirman (1974) and Pazner and Schmeidler
(1974) show fundamental trade-oﬀs in the sense that P(S)∩F(S) = ∅ in many situations.
In such situations, MR∗(S) = MT(R∗)(S) = P(S) ∩ F(S) = ∅, so that, following Corollary
1, it is vital to see the class of allocations that GS(S) and MP(R∗)(S) specify. GS(S)
selects all envy-free allocations and all allocations that Pareto dominates at least one envy-
free allocation. Such a choice set is too large and does not eﬀectively narrow down the
candidates for a social choice. Theorem 3.(ii) is informative in that Nishimura (2000) and
Tadenuma’s (2002, 2005) criteria are reﬁnements of the GS rule. Nishimura (2007) applied
the analysis in production economies where individuals have diﬀerent productivities, in
both ﬁrst-best and second-best environments.
5 Concluding Remarks
The present paper is part of a larger project in welfare economics and social choice theory
to construct ranking and choice criteria based on Pareto eﬃciency accompanied with a
suitable notion of equity. The concept of no-envy satisﬁes the classic framework of ordinal
9A choice function C(·) satisﬁes the Chernoﬀ’s Axiom if, for all S1 and S2 with S1 ⊂ S2, S1 ∩ C(S2) ⊂
C(S1) has to hold. In Example 2, set S1 = {x,x
0} and S2 = S. Then x
0 6∈ GS(S1), so that the Chernoﬀ’s
Axiom is violated (Suzumura (1981, Example 4)). A choice function satisﬁes the Superset Axiom if, for all
S1 and S2 with S1 ⊂ S2 and C(S2) ⊂ C(S1), C(S1) = C(S2) has to hold. Suzumura (1981, Example 3),
which is our Example 1, showed GS rule’s violation of the Superset Axiom for S1 = {x,z} and S2 = S.
10For example, Tadenuma (2002, Proposition 4) and Nishimura (2007, Theorem 1) showed that
MPFE(S
∗) could be empty in exchange economies and production economies, respectively. Tadenuma
(2007) examined the Chernoﬀ’s Axiom and the Path Independence of the social choice correspondences
satisfying the eﬃciency-ﬁrst and the equity-ﬁest principles.
9non-comparability, and it is possible to construct a binary relation based on no-envy. It
is therefore important to provide a conceptual framework that synthesizes the previous
studies. Recent studies show the usefulness for applications to economic environments,
including Tadenuma (2002, 2005, 2007) and Nishimura (2007).
Appendix
In facilitating the proof of Theorem 3, we prove here that MP(R∗)(S) = MPFE(S) ∪
MFEP(S). We begin with showing MP(R∗)(S) ⊂ MPFE(S) ∪ MFEP(S). For any z ∈ S
we will divide into four cases by whether it is in P(S) or not, and whether it is in F(S) or
not. Then, we will examine conditions for those allocations to be included to MP(R∗)(S).
Case 1 z ∈ P(S) ∩ F(S).
By deﬁnition, [P(S) ∩ F(S) ∩ MP(R∗)(S)] ⊂ [P(S) ∩ F(S)]. Notice that P(S) ∩ F(S) is
either empty or included in MPFE(S), by Tadenuma (2002, Proposition 3). As the empty
set is a subset of any set, we conclude:
[P(S) ∩ F(S) ∩ MP(R∗)(S)] ⊂ MPFE(S) ∪ MFEP(S). (4)
Case 2 z 6∈ P(S) and z 6∈ F(S).
There exists x ∈ P(S) which Pareto dominates z, which also dominates z according to
P(R∗) by (3). Therefore, no such z is included in MP(R∗)(S). We showed that
[F(S)c ∩ P(S)c ∩ MP(R∗)(S)] = ∅. (5)
Case 3 z 6∈ P(S) and z ∈ F(S).
For z to be in MP(R∗)(S), there is no x for which condition (a) of (3) is applicable. This
means that
∀x[x ∈ F(S) → ¬(x P z)],
10which means that z ∈ MFEP(S), by Tadenuma (2002, Proposition 5). As P(S)∩F(S) ⊂
MFEP(S), the following holds:
F(S) ∩ MP(R∗)(S) = [P(S) ∩ F(S) ∩ MP(R∗)(S)] ∪ [P(S)c ∩ F(S) ∩ MP(R∗)(S)]
⊂ [P(S) ∩ F(S)] ∪ [P(S)c ∩ F(S) ∩ MP(R∗)(S)] (6)
⊂ MFEP(S).
Case 4 z ∈ P(S) and z 6∈ F(S).
For z to be in MP(R∗)(S), there is no x for which condition (b) of (3) is applicable. This
means that
∀x[x 6P z,z 6P x → x 6∈ F(S), thus x ∈ F(S) → z P x],
i.e., z must beat any envy-free allocation by Pareto test, which means that z ∈ MPFE(S)
by Tadenuma (2002, Proposition 3.(ii)). As P(S)∩F(S) ⊂ MPFE(S), the following holds:
P(S) ∩ MP(R∗)(S) = [P(S) ∩ F(S) ∩ MP(R∗)(S)] ∪ [P(S) ∩ F(S)c ∩ MP(R∗)(S)]
⊂ [P(S) ∩ F(S)] ∪ [P(S) ∩ F(S)c ∩ MP(R∗)(S)] (7)
⊂ MPFE(S).
Combining (4), (5), (6), and (7), we show the desired result of MP(R∗)(S) ⊂ MPFE(S)∪
MFEP(S).
To show MP(R∗)(S) ⊃ MPFE(S)∪MFEP(S), we make use of Tadenuma (2002, Propo-
sitions 3.(ii) and 5) that MFEP(S) ∪ MPFE(S) = P(F(S)) ∪ {x ∈ S|x ∈ P(S) and x P
z ∀z ∈ F(S)}. It is clear that for any z ∈ MFEP(S) ∪ MPFE(S), there is no x ∈ S such
that xP(R∗)z. Q.E.D.
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